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They Could Have Escaped — Instead This Japanese Carrier Sailed Toward Her Death

The 19th of June 1944, as the sun set over the Philippine Sea, witnessed the final hours of JN Ho, one of the aircraft carriers that had once been the backbone of the Imperial Japanese Navy’s carrier aviation force. Flames burned fiercely, the ship’s hull tilted dangerously, and hundreds of sailors fought for the survival of their vessel.

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This was not merely the end of a warship, but a symbol of the collapse of Japanese carrier power in the Pacific. I JN Ho had a special origin. Initially laid down as a luxury passenger liner named Izumo Maru, but when war broke out, the design was changed to convert her into an aircraft carrier. Launched in 1941 and commissioned in July 1942, HEO measured 219 meters in length, had a standard displacement of 24,140 tons, and could carry approximately 53 combat aircraft.

Unlike aircraft carriers designed from the outset for military purposes such as Shokaku or Zuikaku, Hio carried within her technical limitations from her civilian origins. The propulsion system was unstable with a maximum speed of only 25 knots, lower than Japan’s first rate carriers.

However, in the context of carrier scarcity following heavy losses at Midway, HYO remained a valuable asset. During her two years of service, Hio participated in many important campaigns. The ship was present at the Battle of Santa Cruz in October 1942, supported operations in the Solomon Islands, [music] and participated in defensive campaigns in the Central Pacific.

Each time she launched aircraft, pilots from Ho’s [music] deck fought bravely. But gradually, the Japanese Naval Air Force was being worn down by irreplaceable losses. In June 1944, the Pacific War had entered a critical phase. American forces were attacking the Marana Islands. An important chain of islands within Japan’s inner defense perimeter.

If the Maranas fell, American B29 bombers could directly attack Japan’s home islands. This was a red line that Tokyo could not afford to lose. Admiral Suimu Toyota, commander and chief of the combined fleet, activated plan Ago, a decisive campaign aimed at destroying the American carrier force. This mission was assigned [music] to Admiral Jisaburo Ozawa, commander of the first mobile fleet.

Ozawa assembled a considerable force. Nine aircraft carriers carrying a total of 473 aircraft along with five battleships, 13 cruisers, [music] and 28 destroyers. However, this number concealed a painful reality. The quality of Japanese pilots had declined severely. The experienced aces from Pearl Harbor and Coral Sea had mostly perished.

In their place [music] were young pilots hastily trained with few training flight hours and lacking real combat experience. Many of them had only a few dozen flight hours before boarding carriers. Facing them was Task Force 58 under Vice Admiral Mark Mitcher, the most powerful force ever assembled in the Pacific. 15 aircraft carriers carrying nearly 1,000 aircraft escorted by seven new battleships.

21 cruisers and 69 destroyers. American pilots were well trained, their aircraft more modern, especially the F6F Hellcat, the Zero Killer. The American radar and air defense command system had developed to the point of being nearly impenetrable. Within Ozawa’s formation, HiO belonged to carrier fleet C, also known as car div 2, commanded by Admiral Takaji Jooshima.

Alongside HiO were the carrier Juno and the light carrier Ryuo. This was the weakest force among Ozawa’s three carrier groups deployed at the rear of the formation about 100 nautical miles north of the main force. On the morning of the 19th of June 1944, [music] HEO carried 27 aircraft, zero fighters, Judy dive bombers, and Jill torpedo bombers.

This number reflected the decline of Japanese naval aviation. Previously, Hyo could carry over 50 aircraft, but Ozawa no longer had enough aircraft and pilots to fill his carrier decks. Ozawa’s plan relied on one important advantage, range. Japanese aircraft could attack from greater distances than American planes. Ozawa hoped to attack the American fleet while remaining outside counterattack range.

Moreover, Japanese aircraft after attacking could land at airfields on Guam and other Mariana’s islands to refuel, then attack again when returning to carriers. Theoretically, this was a clever plan, but reality would prove it a deadly illusion. At dawn on the 19th of June, tension aboard Ho was thick enough to cut with a knife.

The crew prepared aircraft, loaded ammunition, filled fuel tanks. Young pilots checked their equipment, many unable to hide their anxiety. They knew they were facing the most powerful enemy yet. At 0830, American radar detected the first attack wave from Ozawa’s fleet. 69 Japanese aircraft were heading toward Task Force 58.

This attack originated from carriers in fleets A and B, not from Ho, but their fate would foreshadow tragedy for the entire Japanese naval air force that day. The American response was swift and deadly. The radar-based combat direction system allowed them to launch interceptors from long range. Dozens of F6F Hellcats were launched, guided precisely to the Japanese aircraft positions.

American pilots had trained in tactics to counter the zero. They didn’t enter old style dog fights, but used the Hellcat’s advantages in speed and durability. Dive down, fire, then accelerate away. The result was disaster. In the first attack wave, only 20 Japanese aircraft survived to return. The others fell into the sea in droves, shot down by Hellcats or destroyed by anti-aircraft fire from the American fleet.

But Ozawa didn’t recognize the scale of the disaster. Poor communications systems and false reports from surviving pilots led him to believe the attack had damaged the Americans. He ordered continued attacks. At 0900, a second attack wave with 130 aircraft was launched. This time, aircraft from HO and other ships in Cardiv 2 participated.

Young pilots from Ho’s deck flew in formation, heading south where the American fleet waited. Once again, American radar detected them early. Once again, Hellcats were launched to intercept. In the air, inexperienced Japanese pilots faced veteran American warriors, obsolete [music] tactics, inferior aircraft, weaker skills, all converged [music] into a predetermined outcome.

American pilots later described that day’s air battle as a turkey shoot. Japanese aircraft fell in waves. The cumbersome Jill torpedo bombers moving slowly were easy targets. The Judy bombers didn’t even reach the American fleet. The Zero, once king of the skies, was now prey for the Hellcat.

The second attack wave lost 98 of 130 aircraft. Survivors flew to Guam to land as planned, but there they were intercepted by Hellcats from carriers and land-based American aircraft. There was no safe haven. At midday on the 19th of June, Ozawa launched a third attack wave with 47 aircraft. Once again, they met the steel wall of Hellcats and anti-aircraft fire.

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